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SHAPING INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS To MEET THE
REALITIES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
CONNOR B. EGAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Water will always be one of the world's most vital resources' and
its regulation is integral to local, national, and international stability.2 In the
United States alone, more than ninety-five percent of the Nation's
freshwater is "interstate in nature," meaning shared among the states.
Because water spans state borders, its regulation has resulted in interstate
conflict.4
Over the past century, demand for water has risen, while supply has
decreased precipitously.5 The United States Bureau of Reclamation predicts
that the Colorado River Basin, which spans seven states and supplies over
forty million residents with water,6 will have a supply-demand imbalance of
over three million acre-feet by the year 2060.' This ominous prediction
means that the Colorado River Basin will be unable to provide for its forty
million dependents.8 This looming water scarcity stresses the immediate
need for effective water resource governance.
Currently, interstate compacts govern the majority of the Nation's
interstate waters.9 An interstate compact is, in essence, a contract between
states, which is given the effect of federal law.' 0 However, these compacts
have proven to be an inefficient means of resolving interstate water
* Staff Member, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW, 2013-2014; B.A. 2009, Centre College; J.D. expected May 2015, University of Kentucky.1 U.N. EDUC. SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME,
THE U.N. WORLD WATER DEV. REP. 3: WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD 96 (2009), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001819/181993e.pdf#page=121.
2 See Craig A. Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States: Human Rights,
National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 785, 796-97
(2009).
3 Noah D. Hall, Interstate Water Compacts and Climate Change Adaptation, 5 ENvTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 237, 239 (2010).
4 See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (1lth Cir. 2011).
s See Arnold, supra note 2, at 786-87.6 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER
SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2012), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Executive%20Summary/CRBSExecutive
_Summary FINAL.pdf.
Id. at 9.
See id at 9-10.
Hall, supra note 3, at 239-40.
'
0 Id. at 257-58.
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conflict." This Note proposes the creation of a federal administrative board
to oversee the implementation and regulation of interstate water compacts
and to ensure efficient and equitable resolutions of interstate water disputes.
Part II of this Note will discuss the development of water regulation
in the United States and examine present and future water scarcity. Part III
analyzes interstate compacts through the consideration of three interstate
water rights decisions, which highlight the general benefit of the interstate
compact as a means of interstate regulation, while underscoring the
method's current shortcomings. Part IV gives a detailed discussion of the
United States Supreme Court's most recent holding on interstate water
rights, Tarrant v. Hermann, and the implications of the Court's heightened
deference to the interstate compact. Finally, Part V recommends the
implementation of a federal administrative board to ensure interstate water
compacts meet the demands of the twenty-first century.
II. THE HISTORY OF WATER REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
To fully appreciate the need for increased federal oversight of
interstate compacts, it is important to understand the development of water
regulation in the United States. This section will examine the basic theories
governing United States water law, address their application in current
regulation, and discuss water scarcity and its implications for future
regulation.
A. Common Law and Water Rights Theory
The Nation's current water rights systems developed from the
English common law.12 In the early nineteenth century, landowners had
riparian rights to bodies of water adjacent to their property. 3 These riparian
rights granted landowners a property interest in the "continued flow and
reasonable use of waters passing over or adjacent to their property."l4
Essentially, landowners could use adjacent water as they pleased, so long as
it did not affect others' use of the same water source.1s
In contrast to the East, water in the American West was far less
abundant. In response to this deficiency, westward expansion prompted the
1 See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983) (discussing a dispute between Texas
and New Mexico over enforcement of the Pecos River Compact); In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water
Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (11 th Cir. 2011), for paradigmatic cases involving water compact disputes.
12 James L. Huffman, The Federal Role in Water Resource Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 669, 676-77 (2008).
13 Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority
Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 241, 250 (2006).
14 Huffman, supra note 12, at 677.
Is Benson, supra note 13, at 250.
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development of a water rights system known as the "prior appropriation
doctrine." 1 Based on property law's first-in-time theory, the prior
appropriation doctrine reasons that the first person to put a water source to a
beneficial use has a superior claim to later consumers. 17 By the 1860s, the
doctrine expanded to provide that the first utilizer of a water source
possesses the exclusive right to appropriate all the water they require.18
Consequently, the initial claimant could divert the entire water source,
completely depriving later downstream-claimants, without repercussion.' 9
In 1865, the Supreme Court accepted this practice as constitutional.2 0
The Eastern riparian system and the Western prior appropriation
theory both exist today, and are often utilized in settling water disputes. 2 1 It
is important to note, however, that these systems only deal with surface
water because they were developed prior to the great technological
advancements of the twentieth century. Due to modern innovations, great
stores of underground water, known as groundwater, became accessible.
One of these advancements, the centrifugal pump, which came into use in
the 1930s and 1940s, made it possible to tap the Nation's expansive
aquifers.22 The enhanced availability of groundwater quickly rendered it a
valuable and exploitable resource. 23 As a result of this technological
advancement, new systems of water rights emerged.24 Unlike the riparian or
prior appropriation theories, groundwater rights are far less cut-and-dry,
and state regulation is often inconsistent.2 5
The aforementioned theories are important, as they describe the
basic approaches for determining water ownership. For the purpose of this
Note, however, the theories themselves are secondary to the authorities
governing these rights.
B. Regulation of Water
Traditionally, water has been regulated by state law.26 Today, each
state employs its own set of water statutes, which stem from the common
16 Huffman, supra note 12, at 677.
" Roy Whitehead, Jr. et al., The Value ofPrivate Water Rights: From a Legal and Economic
Perspective, 9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 313, 318 (2004).
" Id. at 319.
9 Id.
20 Id. (citing Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. 97, 104 (1865)).
21 Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States, 12 SOUTHEASTERN
ENVTL. L.J. 115, 118 (2004).22 Michael Pappas, Unnatural Resource Law: Situating Desalination in Coastal Resource
and Water Law Doctrines, 86 TUL. L. REV. 81, 97 (2011).
23 id.
24 Id.
25 Mark S. Davis & Michael Pappas, Escaping the Sporhase Maze: Protecting State Waters
Within the Commerce Clause, 73 LA. L. REv. 175, 185 (2012).26Id at 183.
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law riparian and prior appropriation theories.27 While current water rights
remain close in nature to their common law predecessors, the status of
water as property varies from state to state.28 Some states consider water
sources to be almost wholly private, while others recognize water as public
property and grant only limited rights to private users.2 9 Additionally, some
states differentiate by water type. Texas, for example, recognizes a greater
private property interest in groundwater than surface water.30
While the United States Constitution does not explicitly mention
state authority to govern water rights, American history has largely
emphasized states as the source of water regulation. 3 The federal
government has, for the most part, acquiesced. As the Bureau of
Reclamation noted in a 2003 Prospectus, "[s]ince 1866, federal water law
and policy has deferred to the states in the allocation and administration of
water within their boundaries." 32
By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the federal
government began to take a more active role in water regulation in attempts
to spur economic development. In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court
recognized that the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution 3 granted Congress the authority to regulate
navigation.34 Using their commerce power, Congress began to expand its
role in water regulation and passed laws to police the dumping of waste into
navigable waterways. In 1902, Congress enacted the Reclamation Act and
began funding water-based projects to boost agriculture. In addition, the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925 gave the Army Corps of Engineers
extensive rights to survey navigable waterways and implement plans for
flood control, navigation, irrigation, and power production.3 7 While these
acts greatly increased the federal government's role in water regulation,
they had little impact on the overall state-ruled regulatory schemes because
they "did not significantly interfere with state responsibilities for the
assignment and enforcement of water rights."
27 Id. at 183-84.
28 Id. at 185-86.
29 Id. at 185.
'o Id. at 186.
31 Huffman, supra note 12, at 672-73.
32 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WATER 2025: PREVENTING
CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN THE WEST 3 (2003), available at
http://biodiversity.ca.gov/Meetings/archive/water03/water2025.pdf [hereinafter WATER 2025].
3 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 22 (1824).
35 See Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2014).
36 Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (2014).
37 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1186 (2014).
38 Huffman, supra note 12, at 681.
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By the mid-twentieth century, the federal government began to play
a more substantial role in water regulation involving multiple states.39
Expanding state populations, particularly in the West, caused the allocation
of shared water sources to become an increasingly contentious matter.40
Early interstate water disputes eventually wound their way to the Supreme
Court, which found jurisdiction by reasoning: "[i]f the two States were
absolutely independent nations [the water dispute] would be settled by
treaty or by force. Neither of these ways being practicable, it must be
settled by decision of this court." 41 Resolution of early state disputes
resulted in apportionment, in which the Supreme Court would establish a
permanent distribution of the interstate water based on a number of factors,
including prior use and need.42 Such apportionments proved extremely
difficult and impractical, due to the myriad of determinations necessary for
43
a court to equitably apportion water resources.
In 1909, the Supreme Court, in Washington v. Oregon, responded
to the difficulties of apportionment and proposed an alternative state-
backed resolution stemming from a constitutional provision allowing
interstate compacts:
We submit to the States of Washington and Oregon
whether it will not be wise for them to pursue the same
course, and, with the consent of Congress, through the aid
of commissioners, adjust, as far as possible, the present
appropriate boundaries between the two States and their
respective jurisdiction."
39 Id. at 683-84.
40 John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and
Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENv. WATER L. REv. 299, 318 (2006).
4' Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907).
42 See Charles T. DuMars & Stephen Curtice, Interstate Compacts Establishing State
Entitlements to Water: An Essential Part of the Water Planning Process, 64 OKLA. L. REv. 515, 528
(2012).
43 See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945) ("Apportionment calls for the
exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the
guiding principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several
sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability
of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream
areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former-these are
all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature
of the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.")
" Washington v. Oregon, 214 U.S. 205, 218 (1909).
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This decision by the Supreme Court ushered in the current era of state
reliance on interstate compacts to allocate water and settle distribution
disputes. 45
The Compact Clause of the United States Constitution provides,
"[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State."46 Under this clause, states may
enter into an agreement only if approved by Congress.47 If Congress ratifies
the compact, it takes the form of binding federal law, which in turn
establishes federal jurisdiction over any later disputes.48
Interstate water compacts serve a variety of purposes. They are
used to resolve future disputes regarding the water source, apportion state
rights to the water source at issue, and bar non-contracted use of water
without explicit permission. 4 9 That being said, economic protection has
been highlighted as the central purpose for the interstate compact.50 These
compacts prevent state users of interstate water from hurrying to deplete the
resource: "[e]ach state is given a fund of water free from the priorities of
the other, each can develop at its own pace, and the slower state is protected
from a complete takeover of the joint resource by the faster."5
Today, the interstate compact, which is discussed in more detail in
Part III, is a favored and useful means of interstate water allocation. 52
Nevertheless, interstate waters not governed by compacts are still subject to
court apportionment.53
C. Water Scarcity
The major impetus behind water regulation is impending scarcity
and the risk of future conflict. 54 As exemplified by the differences in water
rights between the American East and West, abundance or scarcity of water
can greatly affect its regulation.55 For one, disputes over the resource are far
less common in times of abundance. Unfortunately, the forecast for water in
45 See Edella Schlager & Tanya Heikkila, Resolving Water Conflicts: A Comparative
Analysis of Interstate River Compacts, 37 POL'Y STUD. J. 367, 369 (2009), available at
http://water.columbia.edu/files/201 1/1 1/Heikkila2009ResolvingWater.pdf.
" U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
4 See DuMars & Curtice, supra note 42, at 529.
48Id
49 Id. at 530.
so Frank J. Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U.
COLO. L. REV. 347, 349 (1985).
51Id.
52 Schlager & Heikkila, supra note 45, at 369.
s3 Clemons, supra note 21, at 119.
s See WATER 2025, supra note 32.
5s See Benson, supra note 13, at 250-52.
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the United States paints a bleak picture, which foreshadows an increase in
future water conflict. 6
In the United States, over 3.9 trillion gallons of water are consumed
each day. By 2030, the United States Department of State predicts that the
demand for water will exceed its supply by thirty percent. 8 Such a disparity
is predicted to have egregious effects.59 For example, water depletion is
expected to adversely affect the Nation's energy production.60 Both natural
gas extraction, which uses hydraulic fracturing to access stores of natural
gas, and hydroelectric power, depend extensively on the availability of
water. As cautioned by the Washington Post in a 2013 article on America's
water supply: "[i]t should be clear that the consequences of diminishing
water supplies from the individual and collective effects of just these few
items can adversely affect the routine ways of life - and, importantly, can
do so within the time frame of a single generation.",6 Furthermore, the
United States Department of State warns that "[b]etween now and 2040,
fresh water availability will not keep up with demand absent more effective
management of water resources."62
A glaring example of water depletion in the United States is the
Ogallala Aquifer in the High Plains region of the American West. The
Ogallala is a vast reservoir spanning eight states and the exclusive 6Vrovider
of water for over twenty-seven percent of America's agriculture. Due to
current consumption levels, the Ogallala's water table is dropping at a rate
of up to three feet per year.64 Current estimates predict that if the United
States continues its current trend of consumption the aquifer will be
depleted in less than twenty-five years,6 5 leaving over a quarter of the
country's farmland without an irrigation source.
The future availability of water is uncertain and its growing scarcity
will likely result in extensive conflict. 66 The next section of this Note will
56 See Steve Tracton, World Water Day: A Forceful Reminder that the US. is Running Out of
Fresh Water, WASH. POST BLOG (Mar. 22, 2013, 12:40 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/wp/2013/03/22/world-water-day-a-
forceful-reminder-that-the-u-s-is-running-out-of-fresh-water/.
57 Water Facts, WATER INFO. PROGRAM, http://www.waterinfo.org/resources/water-facts
(last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
5 See Tracton, supra note 56.
9 See id.
6 See id.
61 Id.
62 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, GLOBAL WATER SECURITY 1 (2012)
[hereinafter GLOBAL WATER SECURITY], available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Special%20ReportICA%20Global%20Water%/o20Security.pdf.
63 Ramez Naam, The Limits of the Earth, Part 1: Problems, Sci. AM. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2013/04/17/the-limits-of-the-earth-part-1-problems/.
6 Id.
65 Tracton, supra note 56.
6 See GLOBAL WATER SECURITY, supra note 62.
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look at past interstate disputes regarding water, and the interstate compact's
effectiveness at resolving these conflicts.
III. "THE GOOD, THE, BAD AND THE UGLY": WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM
INTERSTATE COMPACTS
As discussed above, interstate compacts are congressionally ratified
state agreements, which take the form of federal law. In 1938, the Supreme
Court described the interstate compact as "adapt[ing] to our Union of
sovereign States the age-old treaty making power of independent sovereign
nations." 67 By the twentieth century, the interstate compact gained favor
over judicial resolution and became the preferred means of settling water
disputes. 68 States were drawn to interstate compacts because of an
expectation that it would "allow them to jointly provide for the efficient use
and equitable apportionment of the water from shared rivers, while
promoting 'interstate comity."' 69
Over the last half-century, however, conflicts over water compacts
have risen steadily. In 1999, an empirical study by Edella Schlager and
Tanya Heikkila analyzed the effectiveness of fourteen water compacts in
the American West. 70 The study found that interstate compact commissions,
which are the administrative bodies that oversee some water compacts,7
were effective in implementing operational-level changes, but were unable
to address more complex issues, such as "deep-seated conflicts" between
states.72 Each conflict involving collective choice between the states made
its way to the Supreme Court before a resolution was found.73 Four of these
cases involved downstream states dissatisfied with their upstream partners
that failed to comply with the compacts.74 While Schlager and Heikkila's
study concluded that interstate compacts were capable of resolving many
operational issues, the study suggested that judicial venues might be better
equipped "for revising and adapting compacts to better fit changing
circumstances."75
This section will consider three separate interstate disputes that
required judicial resolution. The consequent analysis will illustrate that
judicial resolution, while ultimately effective in settling disputes, is an
inefficient means of resolution that does not comport with the impending
67 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104 (1938).
68 Schlager & Heikkila, supra note 45, at 369.
69 id.
7o Clemons, supra note 21, at 131.
72 Schlager & Heikkila, supra note 45, at 386.
73 d at 384.
7
1Id at 386.
334
SHAPING INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS
scarcity of our Nation's water sources or the need for more immediate
action.
A. The Pecos River Compact: Where Interstate Compacts Fall Short
The Pecos River flows between Texas and New Mexico and has
historically been relied on by both states. 6 By the 1940s, the risk of the
river's depletion prompted the two states to attempt to apportion the water
between them.7 7 In 1949, Congress ratified the Pecos River Compact.78 A
key element to the compact was that New Mexico agreed not to reduce the
river's flow "below an amount that will give to Texas a quantity of water
equivalent to that available to Texas" under an earlier provision.79
Unfortunately, the Pecos River Compact did not prevent New
Mexico from using more than its apportioned share. By 1970, Texas filed
suit in the Supreme Court of the United States alleging that New Mexico
had breached the terms of the compact.so Specifically, Texas claimed that
New Mexico had regularly depleted the river below the amount stipulated
in the compact.8 1 New Mexico denied the allegation, and a dispute arose
over how the compact was to measure water depletion, an issue which was
addressed in the compact through a faulty formula.82
In its opinion, the Supreme Court emphasized that congressional
ratification of an interstate compact transforms the proposed agreement
between the states into federal law. 83 The Court explained, "[o]ne
consequence of this metamorphosis is that, unless the compact to which
Congress has consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may order
relief inconsistent with its express terms."84 Thus, the Court recommended
that the states renegotiate the compact to amend the "paralyzing impasses"
that brought about the conflict. This conclusion left the two states in a
stalemate that lasted over two decades.86 A key contention in the stalemate
between Texas and New Mexico was the certainty that, should the compact
be amended, one state would lose out: "[t]he logical solution would be to
update the formula, to take account of half a century's worth of hydrology.
76 Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 557 (1983).
7 Chad 0. Dorr, "Unless and Until It Proves to Be Necessary": Applying Water Interest to
Prevent Unjust Enrichment in Interstate Water Disputes, 101 CALiF. L. REv. 1763, 1763 (2013).
78 Id. at 1788.
7 Pecos River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-91, 63 Stat. 159 (1949) (codified at TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 42.010 (West 2013)).
80 Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 562.
81 Id
82 Clemons, supra note 21, at 131-32.
83 Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 564.
84 Id.
s Id. at 565.
86 Clemons, supra note 21, at 132.
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But the state that lost water, whichever it was, would inevitably block a
new deal."87 In 2003, the Pecos River Compact conflict was quelled by the
Pecos River Settlement Agreement, which put to rest some of the major
contentions."
The Pecos River Compact highlights several key weaknesses of
interstate compacts. For one, the status of the compact as federal law
renders the Supreme Court unable to alter any faulty provisions that may
arise.89 Second, the high demand of water and its scarcity can foster
adversarial negotiations and stall compromise-it took Texas and New
Mexico over twenty years to resolve how the Pecos River water depletion
should be calculated.90 Such a slow resolution process would certainly be
ineffective in an emergency or crisis situation.
B. The Delaware River Basin Compact: An Interstate Compact Working
Properly
As opposed to the Pecos River Compact, the Delaware River Basin
Compact stands as a pristine example of how an interstate compact can
work effectively.
Similar to the Pecos River, the Delaware River Basin was a source
of much conflict by the turn of the twentieth century.9' By the second half
of the 1900s, over twenty million people, spread out among Delaware, New
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, relied on the basin.92 At the outset of
the Delaware Basin conflict, the Supreme Court apportioned the river;9 3
however, the states continued to manage the water separately. Recognizing
the ineffectiveness of this method, the states consolidated their management
systems into a single entity under the Delaware River Basin Compact.94
A principal feature of the Delaware Compact is its governance. A
commission, comprised of one representative from each of the compacting
states, as well as a federal commissioner appointed directly by the President
of the United States, administers the compact.95 Most commission decisions
require a majority vote, as opposed to unanimity, preventing Pecos River-
like stalemates." Furthermore, the Delaware Compact is comprehensive in
8 A Lawsuit Runs Through It, ECONOMIST (Nov. 14, 2002),
http://www.economist.com/node/1446707.
88 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTrERIOR, PECOS RIVER SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT (2009), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/feature/pecos/.
89 See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 564.
9 See Clemons, supra note 21, at 131-32.
9' Id. at 132.
9 Id.
9 See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
9 Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
9' Clemons, supra note 21, at 133.
% 1d
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nature and forward-looking, which allows the compact to adapt to changing
circumstances. One academic has praised the compact's "cooperative,
planning-oriented structure" as affording it the ability to combat such issues
as "droughts, water supply development, and pollution control." 97
The Delaware Compact is a prime example of how a compact can
work effectively, and as of now, it has done so. Unfortunately, this
Compact stands as an exception.
C. The Tri-State Water Dispute: The Rise of Conflict and the Inadequacy of
Interstate Compacts to Meet the Challenge
In the West, water rights disputes have been a reality since early
American expansion.98 In contrast, the East, with its abundant rainfall and
plentiful water, experienced very little conflict until the last part of the
twentieth century. 9 In 1986, however, the East's immunity to water
disputes ended with a conflict arising between Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia, over their respective rights to a Georgia-based lake and its
tributaries. This conflict, commonly known as the Tri-State Water Rights
Litigation,100 lasted over two decades and stands as a strong indicator of the
Nation's growing need for a diminishing resource.
In the mid-1980s, the state of Georgia suffered an extreme
drought. 101 Atlanta, the home of over forty percent of the state's
population,102 was forced to ration its water supply, which was partially
provided by the nearby Army Corps of Engineers-controlled Lake
Lanier.103 In 1989, still struggling with the drought, Georgia applied for a
permit with the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to withdraw a half-
billion gallons of water per day from Lake Lanier.10 However, Georgia was
not the only state depending on the lake. Lake Lanier is part of a tributary
system that feeds the Chattahoochee River, on which both Alabama and
Florida rely. 05 Fearing that Atlanta's increased upstream withdrawal could
disproportionally affect its use of the water system, Alabama, later joined
by Florida, filed suit to enjoin the Corps from granting Georgia's request. 06
9 Id. at 134.
98 See Dustin S. Stephenson, The Tri-State Compact: Falling Waters and Fading
Opportunities, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 83, 83 (2000).
9 Id. at 83-84.
'"In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (1 Ith Cir. 2011).
101 Stephenson, supra note 98, at 86.
102 Id. at 85.
103 Id. at 86.
"4 Id. at 86-87.
105 Clemons, supra note 21, at 137.
' See Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1122-23 (11th Cir. 2005).
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In 1990, a federal district court stayed litigation allowing the states
and the Corps to negotiate their own resolution.'07 The negotiations were
extensive, as the states' interests clashed.108 For Florida, the Lake Lanier
system fed a bay housing a $70 million dollar oyster industry that required
an adequate supply of Lake Lanier's freshwater to survive.'09 In addition,
Alabama believed that an increased allocation to Atlanta would result in
higher energy costs for its residents, which in turn, would negatively affect
its ability to attract commerce to the state."o In response, Georgia argued
that since the lake was within its borders, it held the position of sovereign
and could use the water as it pleased."'
By 1997, to deal with the dispute, the states formed two separate
compacts.!12 Unfortunately, these compacts lacked a mechanism to allocate
water amongst the three states. In essence, the compacts were an
"agreement to agree" on an equitable allocation of Lake Lanier's water.113
The interstate compacts soon crumbled and litigation resumed."14
A major issue in the renewed litigation was whether the Corps, who
had authority over the lake through the Rivers and Harbors Act and the
Water Supply Act, was authorized to reallocate water without congressional
approval.' '5 In 2009, the federal district court granted summary judgment
for Alabama and Florida, finding that such a withdrawal required
congressional approval, giving Georgia a three-year time frame to acquire
approval or have Atlanta's water supply cut off."6 Fortunately for Atlanta,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the Corps did have authority to
reallocate portions of Lake Lanier for Atlanta's water supply. 117
The Tri-State Litigation illustrates the shortcomings of interstate
compacts in the realm of water allocation. Most importantly, without a
regulatory foundation for the interstate compact, states are left to their own
devices to apportion water. As seen in the Tri-State Litigation, opposing
interests will inevitably hinder the effectiveness of compact creation. One
criticism of the Tri-State compacts was their inclusion of stipulations that
107 Lewis B. Jones et al., Updating Twentieth Century Water Projects to Meet Twenty-First
Century Needs: Lessons from the Tri-State Water Wars, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 959, 966 (2013).
1os Greg Bluestein & Daniel Malloy, Latest Phase of Water Wars Plays Out in Congress,
ATLANTA J. CONST. (June 14, 2013), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/latest-phase-of-water-wars-plays-
out-in-congress/nYKnC/.
109 Clemons, supra note 21, at 136.
1 Id.
1n Id.
112 See Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111
Stat. 2219 (1997); Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105, 111 Stat.
2233 (1997).
113 Clemons, supra note 21, at 137.
114 Jones et al., supra note 107, at 966.
115 In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1309-10 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
"
6 Id. at 1356.
" In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1192-97 (11 th Cir. 2011).
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the states reach unanimous consent before any allocation became
effective. A unanimous consent requirement, however, comports with
states' reasonable desires to protect their own interests. States do not want
to risk losing water rights through an unfavorable majority allocation. The
ineffectiveness of the Tri-State compacts, among other things, highlights
the necessity of an effective federal administrative body to oversee compact
creation and implementation and resolve future disputes.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S. WATER REGULATION
Water has been, and will continue to be, an area of dispute for the
foreseeable future. As the Nation's population grows, water resources
dwindle. 11 Accordingly, water conservation has become an undeniable
need. There are currently twenty-three interstate water compacts and120
competing water interests will likely continue to be a source of great
contention. In 2013, the role of the interstate compact was brought into
question when the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Tarrant Regional Water Distributors v. Herrmann, which concerned an
interstate compact dispute between the states of Texas and Oklahoma.121
This section considers the Supreme Court's holding in Tarrant and
discusses its implications.
A. Tarrant v. Herrmann: Continued State Deference
In the early 2000s, North Texas's population grew precipitously. 122
This growth put an extreme strain on many of the region's water districts.
Tarrant, a North Texas water agency, was especially affected by the
growth.123 Beginning in 2000, Tarrant made several attempts to acquire out-
of-state water to quench the region's thirst.124 In 2007, Tarrant applied for a
permit to acquire water from Oklahoma's Water Resource Board.125 Aware
that Oklahoma had a series of protectionist statutes preventing out-of-state
entities' access to Oklahoma water,126 the Texan water district sued to
enjoin Oklahoma's Board from enforcing the state's laws.127
118 Clemons, supra note 21, at 139.
" See WATER 2025, supra note 32.
120 L. William Staudenmaier, Interstate Water Compacts: The Supreme Court Once Again
Endorses State Sovereignty Over Water Resources, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 26, 2013),
http://www.bna.com/interstate-water-compacts-nl7179874750/.
121 Tarrant Reg Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (granting certiorari).
122 Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2128 (2013).
123 Id. at 2128.
124 id
15Id.
126 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 105.12 (West 2014).
127 Tarrant Reg Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. at 2129.
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In support of their claim, Tarrant relied heavily on the existence of
an interstate compact between the two states.128 In 1978, Congress ratified
the Red River Compact-a contractual distribution of the Red River basin
between Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana.129 The initial purpose
of the Red River Compact was the "equitable apportionment among the
Signatory States of the water of the Red River and its tributaries."l3 0 The
compact divided the Red River basin into 5 divisions termed "reaches."' 3'
These reaches were further divided into areas called "subbasins." 32
One fundamental component of the Red River Compact was water
storage. 133 Louisiana lacked an adequate reservoir to store water during
times of excess flow, and the other three states were unwilling to allow
Louisiana the use of their own reservoirs.13 4 To compensate Louisiana for
this disparity, the Compact explicitly provided Louisiana with access to the
flow of water in Reach II, subbasin 5, located in Oklahoma.13 5 Specifically,
the Compact stated that "[t]he Signatory States shall have equal rights" to
the water in subbasin 5 when the water's flow exceeded a certain
minimum. 13 6 However, the Compact barred any state from using more than
twenty-five percent of subbasin 5's excess water. 137 To protect the
apportionment of subbasin 5, the Compact established a conditional
accounting provision, requiring the apportionment of any excess water from
the subbasin upon request.'38 Finally, the Compact specified that outside its
particular purposes, no party would be permitted to "[i]nterfere with or
impair the right or power of any [other] Signatory State to regulate within
its boundaries the appropriation, use, and control of water, or quality of
water, not inconsistent with its obligations under this Compact." 3 9
By 2013, Texas's suit had made its way to the Supreme Court. 40
Tarrant argued that the compact's silence with regard to state borders, when
it apportioned subbasin 5 of Reach II, meant that all four states were
permitted "cross-border diversions."'41 Citing the express terms of the
compact, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court explained, "[w]e have
128Id
129 Joe Patranella, Love Thy Neighbor As Thyself An Analysis of the Texas Water Shortage,
Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, and Why Oklahoma Should Be Mandated to Allow Texas
to Purchase Water, 52 S. TEX. L. REv. 297, 310 (2010).
130 Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. at 2126.
13 1 Id at 2122.
132 d
14Id.
135id.
'
6 Id. at 2127.
" Id. at 2122.
"'
8 Id. at 2127.
1e Tarrant Reg Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (granting certiorari).
141 Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. at 2130.
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long understood that as sovereign entities in our federal system, the States
possess an 'absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under
them for their own common use."' 4 2 The Court further highlighted the
United States' tradition of recognizing "ownership of submerged lands, and
the accompanying power to control navigation, fishing, and other public
uses of water, [as] an essential attribute of [state] sovereignty." 4 3
The Court further explained that adopting Texas's interpretation of
the compact "would necessarily entail assuming that Oklahoma . . . silently
surrendered substantial control over the water within [its] borders when [it]
agreed to the Compact . . . , we find this unlikely to have been the intent of
the Compact's signatories." 144 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found
Tarrant's reliance on the apportionment of subbasin 5's water supply
between the four states unconvincing. Instead, the Court interpreted the
accounting provision in the Compact to read that the subbasin's water "is
allocated to Oklahoma unless and until another State calls for an accounting
and Oklahoma is asked to refrain from utilizing more than its entitled
share."l45
In addition, Tarrant argued that the dormant Commerce Clause
rendered Oklahoma's protectionist statutes unconstitutional.14 6 Specifically,
Tarrant claimed it was unconstitutional for Oklahoma to "discriminate
against interstate commerce" by "erecting barriers" to prevent the
distribution of subbasin 5's excess flow.147 The Court quickly dismissed
this contention by concluding that subbasin 5's water was allocated to
Oklahoma under the Compact, and that the dormant Commerce Clause
would only apply to unallocated water: "[t]he Oklahoma water statutes
cannot discriminate against interstate commerce with respect to unallocated
waters because the Compact leaves no waters unallocated."l 4 8
The holding in Tarrant highlights the Supreme Court's deference to
state rights in interstate compact disputes. As opposed to the unified
approach of the Delaware Compact, the Red River Compact allowed all
four states to maintain their own administration of the water.149 Hence, the
Court upheld the compact's provisions by enforcing Oklahoma's right to
govern its own water. The Supreme Court was wholly unwilling to imbue
any cross-border rights without specific allowance.
142 Id. at 2129-30 (citing Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842)).
143 id
'
44 Id. at 2133.
14 5 Id. at 2137.
14 6 Id. at 2136.
14 7 Id. at 2137.
'
48 Id. at 2136.
1' Id. at 2122.
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Tarrant demonstrates that interstate compacts, with a few
exceptions,'" are an ineffective, if not wholly inadequate, means of dealing
with crises. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's holding stresses the
unwillingness to change the Nation's highly state-deferential stance towards
water rights without explicit instruction. However, the Court's
jurisprudence does not comport with society's interest in preserving and
sustaining our country's depleting water supply. Therefore, the Court's
decision in Tarrant illuminates the need for the United States Congress to
implement a sustainable and flexible federal water policy to preserve and
apportion water as a vital resource.
V. A FEDERAL APPROACH
The prevalence of the interstate compact as a method of resolving
water disputes over the twentieth century establishes the necessity of
compacts in the implementation of any future interstate water. However, as
clearly highlighted above, the interstate compact is far from perfect.
Therefore, Congress should take steps to fill the void where interstate
compacts fall short. By creating a federal administrative board to oversee
interstate water compacts, Congress can standardize the interstate compact
and ensure efficient and equitable resolutions in times of conflict. The first
part of this section will discuss the means by which Congress could
establish its authority to regulate water, and the second part will discuss the
role of the proposed agency and its necessity for a sustainable future.
A. Sporhase v. Nebraska: A Foundation for Federal Regulation
In the 1982 case Sporhase v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court was
called upon to settle a dispute regarding a state's protectionist attempts to
bar out-of-state parties from accessing its water supply.' 5 In particular, a
Nebraska statute required any person wishing to transport Nebraska water
out-of-state for an out-of-state use to obtain a permit from the state's water
resource department. 152 The director of the department was required to
grant the permit if he or she found that the use was not against the public's
interest and that "the State in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal
rights to withdraw and transport ground water from that State for use in
Nebraska."' 53
1o See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
151 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 943 (1982).
152 Id. at 941.
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Mr. Sporhase purchased 640 acres of land that ran across the
Colorado-Nebraska border. 154 Using a well fifty-five feet inside the
Nebraska portion of his property, Sporhase pumped groundwater that he
used to irrigate both Colorado and Nebraska tracts. "s Sporhase never
applied for a permit; thus, Nebraska filed suit to enjoin him from
transporting the water to Colorado, relying on the state's protectionist
statute. 56 A trial court granted the injunction and the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed.'5 7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 58
One of Nebraska's arguments, which persuaded the state courts, was that
water was not an article of interstate commerce.159 The Supreme Court
disagreed, stating that such a claim was overbroad because "it would not
only exempt Nebraska ground water regulation from burden-on-commerce
analysis, it would also curtail the affirmative power of Congress to
implement its own policies concerning such regulation."o60 To the contrary,
the Court held that water was an article of interstate commerce, which
Congress has the power to regulate.' 6'
With regard to the Nebraska statute, the Court held that there was
nothing unconstitutional about Nebraska's interest in controlling its water
supply: "a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its
own citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce when it
seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State." 62
Specifically, the Court explained that states could establish external water-
use restrictions, insofar as they were aimed at preservation and
conservation. 16 3 The Court, however, found that the statute's reciprocity
requirement was unconstitutional because it was not rationally related to a
conservation or preservation purpose.16
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that Congress had
permitted Nebraska to make an otherwise unconstitutional limitation on
interstate commerce. 165 Specifically, Nebraska claimed that the existence of
interstate compacts clearly highlighted the federal government's deference
to states.16 6 The Court agreed that the federal government was generally
154 Richard S. Harnsberger et al., Interstate Transfers of Water: State Options After Sporhase,
70 NEB. L. REv. 754, 763 (1991).
155Id
56 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. at 941.
' Id. at 942.
" Id. at 944.
' Id. at 953.
161 Ida
163 Id. at 955-56.
163 Id. at 956.
6 Id. at 957-58.
1s Id. at 958.
6 Id.
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deferential to states, but explained that this would not hold true for "the
unilateral imposition of unreasonable burdens on commerce. Hence, the
Supreme Court held that state water, even when allocated according to an
interstate compact, is subject to federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause.16 1
In Sporhase, water was labeled an article of commerce governed by
the Commerce Clause; thus, any regulation aimed at preventing or
hindering interstate water transfers is per se invalid.'6 9 As the Supreme
Court has explained, "we have applied a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity'
against state laws that amount to 'simple economic protectionism,' and
have found such protectionism when a state law 'directly regulates or
discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-
state economic interests over out-of-state interests." 170 In essence, the
Supreme Court held that, while it would remain deferential to states,
Congress did have authority to regulate water through their Commerce
Clause power.
B. A Solution: A Federal Administrative Board to Oversee Interstate Water
Compacts
In Tarrant, the Supreme Court acknowledged Sporhase, which
remains good law. 171 Accordingly, interstate water is an article of
commerce that Congress can regulate under their Commerce Clause
powers. Therefore, through Sporhase's holding, in conjunction with the
Necessary and Proper Clause, one could reason that Congress has the
authority to establish an administrative body in charge of regulating state
compacts dealing with interstate waters through the Commerce Clause.
Congress should create a federal administrative board with explicit
statutory language permitting the Board to regulate water allocation and
conservation within interstate compacts. A fundamental purpose of the
Board's regulatory function should be ensuring that interstate compacts are
capable of adjusting and adapting to the Nation's changing water landscape.
With the Pecos River Compact in mind, these regulations would set water
governance standards to update outmoded or anachronistic compact
provisions.
A regulatory framework for interstate water compacts would
facilitate future interstate collaboration. This framework would aid states in
creating their own compacts, while also quelling fears of inequity. By
'
6 1 Id. at 960.
161 Id at 959-60.
'69 See id at 953.
o
70 Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 489 U.S. 493, 523 (1989).
1' Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2132-33 n.I1 ("[T]he power of
States to control water within their borders may be subject to limits in certain circumstances.").
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establishing a reliable foundation for interstate water compacts, states
involved in conflicts similar to the Tri-State Litigation may be more willing
to agree to interstate water management systems.
Drawing from the successful Delaware River Basin Compact, the
adjudicatory component of the agency would be designed to serve as an
uninterested third party-similar to the presidential appointee on the
Delaware Compact's committee. 172 While many interstate compacts
currently have congressional appointees sitting on their compact
commissions,17 3 such appointments are not mandatory,174 nor do they go far
enough. This proposed Board would have mandatory oversight of all
interstate water compacts. The Board should be comprised of one delegate
from each state currently in an interstate water compact. While these
delegates would be appointed by their respective states, they would be
required to have expertise in the field of water management and
regulation-likely serving on their own state's water management
commissions. During a hearing, interested delegates175 would be required to
abstain from partaking in the adjudication.
The organic act, granting the Board statutory authority, should be
written to give it original jurisdiction to hear all water disputes arising out
of interstate compacts. However, the Board would not have any
prosecutorial powers. Honoring the precedent in both the Tarrant and Pecos
River Adjudications, states would be encouraged to settle their own
disputes. If resolution seems unlikely, however, the state could request a
resolution by the Board. To arrive at a solution, the Board would hold a
hearing with all parties present, to satisfy due process, and then adjudicate
the issue in accordance to its regulations and the existing terms of the
compact. Since the Board would be comprised of experts familiar with
water management and interstate compacts, the resolution would be both
equitable and timely-likely far more so than current compact adjudication.
Above all else, the federal administrative board would be a means
to bring interstate water compacts into the twenty-first century. Water
scarcity and its imminent depletion are likely to give rise to a growing
number of conflicts in the near future. As water is fundamental to our
Nation's growth and sustenance, timely resolution of water conflict is
imperative. The Board would facilitate efficient and equitable resolution to
such disputes, while continuing to honor our Nation's emphasis on state
sovereignty.
172 See Clemons, supra note 21, at 133.
173 See Upper Colorado Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31 (1949); Arkansas River Compact, 63
Stat. 145 (1949).
174 See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 565 (1983).
1s Delegates from the states involved in the hearing would take no part in the adjudication.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Water is necessary for life and is vital to our Nation's future. Water
has been the root of many conflicts throughout our Nation's history, and its
growing scarcity will likely give rise to more. Since the mid-twentieth
century, the United States has relied heavily on interstate compacts to
resolve water disputes among states. While the compact has proved an
effective means to allocate and conserve interstate waters, it is not without
flaw. Most importantly, the interstate compact does not provide effective
and efficient means of resolving conflict. With water's vitality comes the
need for immediacy.
As highlighted by past conflicts, relying on states to resolve their
own water disputes is often a tedious and lengthy process. Twenty-year
attempts to resolve conflicts 176 simply does not comport with the
indispensability of water. In preparation for water's growing scarcity, the
United States needs a reliable and productive system for resolving disputes
and facilitating greater interstate collaboration.
A federal administrative board is a means by which the United
States can maintain its preference for states to remain the principal
regulators of water management and preserve its historic understanding of
water rights, while also ensuring effective and efficient resolution of future
disputes. Furthermore, the establishment of a regulatory body, along with a
concrete foundation for interstate water compacts, will help facilitate future
compacts and make certain our Nation's waters are governed equitably and
efficiently through whatever crises lie ahead.
176 See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1160 (11th Cir. 2011);
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 554.
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